Many leaders make matters worse by actually describing, as they apologize, how they themselves have been affected, as if that should somehow connect them with those suffering and create a bond. Instead it usually comes across as self-indulgent, self-serving and lacking in honesty about having been the cause of the situation.
BP chief apologized for having been oblivious to the safety risks of his organization's underwater drilling operations, but his apology was ineffective--not because it wasn't heartfelt but because he was oblivious to what people truly need from a leader, especially in times of crisis.
Why was the nation repeatedly outraged when BP chief went before cameras and then before Congress to utter his famous flat apologies? He and his media experts seemed surprised that his appearances backfired. Yet it was utterly predictable that the approach was doomed from the start. It clearly failed to do what was necessary to repair the relationship between the people and BP.
1. Do you care about me? No, really. Do you see how this has affected me, my family and my community? Can you put it into words, into specific examples? Have you taken the time to personally witness it from my perspective? As a leader, even if you can't fix it, can you give words to it and be willing to listen while others vent, without explaining, justifying or making false promises? People want to feel heard. They want to be recognized for their suffering. They want to know that you, the leader, see them as individuals and real people. You will end in disaster if you make up story or try to cover up the real fact and that will definitely lead you to your grave.....
2. Can I trust you? Sugarcoating the current reality or painting an idyllic path to a better future does not build trust. People want to know that you are telling them the truth or factual. Will you honestly outline what you know and what you don't know? Speak from a place of pure accountability, and sort out the blame behind closed doors at a later time. A leader needs to fully account for where the situation is at present, how it got there and what the possibilities are for the future. Do not just give the most optimistic options; outline the complete range of potential developments and the plans you have to create results. Be up front about the risks involved, their likelihood and full potential effects and the contingency plans you have in case the worst does happen, as well as in case it doesn't.
3. Are you committed to excellence? Do you have the same standards of excellence as the people you are leading or attempting to serve? People will start questioning whether you are still capable in future to run the company with your handling of crisis or stress maangement. Will you be there for as long as it takes? What does success look like to you? Do you insist on excellence in your business practices? Do you use the best technology and top experts? And are you transparent, allowing access to the media, documenting both your progress and your setbacks? Excellence is not about perfection, it's about commitment to the best possible processes.
It will be hard to repair the cracks in your status should you try to have any cover up or avoid reporting the true fact of the situation. And important to get the correct datas from your team about the facts and figures as everyone will be putting their scope to check and see if the published figures are correctly reported. There are pros' and cons' to whether you should do what it takes and better consult your team of experts within the top management should you run out of options. Likely scenario is someone will be there to replace you when the situation is getting nowhere and the authorities and public are ponding and reporting on your company's credibility and everyday the newspaper is flashing reports of the site situation, hopefully the worst is over for you sooner than later.
25 July 2010 LONDON: British media are reporting that BP chief executive Tony Hayward is negotiating the terms of his departure ahead of the oil company's results announcement this week.
Citing unidentified sources, the BBC and Sunday Telegraph reported that detailed talks regarding Mr Hayward's future had taken place over the weekend. The BBC said a formal announcement on his exit is expected in the next 24 hours.
Asked about the reports, BP spokesman Toby Odone said yesterday that 'Tony Hayward remains BP's chief executive, and he has the confidence of the board and senior management'.
BP's board is scheduled to meet today in London ahead of the company's half-year results announcement tomorrow.
The BBC added that there was a 'strong likelihood' that Mr Hayward would be replaced by Mr Bob Dudley, who took over management of BP's response to the oil spill from Mr Hayward last month.
Mr Hayward has been under heavy criticism over his leadership during the Gulf of Mexico oil spill.
The Sunday Telegraph said there could be wrangling over Mr Hayward's severance package, under which he is likely to be paid a minimum figure of just over £1 million (S$2.1 million).
With events and errors ticked off day by day, hour by hour and then minute by minute as the implacable oil rises from below, the investigation report by BP released on September ( full report could be downloaded from BP website) makes eerie reading. Its tragedy unfolds in four acts, each containing a number of errors: the initial penetration of hydrocarbons into the well through cement seals and physical barriers meant to be impermeable; the subsequent failure to spot that the seals had not worked and that oil and gas were building up in the well as rig workers turned, unaware, to other tasks; the subsequent rig-wrecking explosions; and, at the sea floor, the failure of the blowout preventer to cut off the flow of oil as the rig toppled and its connection to the well below broke open, releasing oil into the Gulf for the next three months. All these findings could be shifting more of the blame to others and looks like BP could be washing it's hands away from some of the "oily" mess.
In the first act, the report claims that Halliburton supplied a cement slurry of its own devising which it should have recognised was not fit for the purpose. Subsequent testing showed that the cement produced by a similar slurry (Halliburton’s own was apparently not made available) would have been likely to break down. BP’s well team, the report goes on, failed to appreciate the challenges of the cementing, to assess the risks and to make sure it knew what was going on. Analysis by Halliburton suggested that extra “centralisers”, which keep the pipe that transports the oil in the right position, were needed. BP procured them but did not use them, its well team suspecting, wrongly, that they were the wrong sort. The report concludes that this error is unlikely to have been key to the cement failure, but it is a pretty striking mistake and others will likely differ on its significance. The team then failed to run a test, or log, to show that the cement seal was OK, a failure that has already been criticised by others.
In the second and third acts, after the hydrocarbons had got through valves at the bottom of the well, the focus shifts to Transocean, and at times to decisions made by people who died in the disaster. When the heavy drilling mud that provides the pressure needed to keep things from coming up the well was removed, first as a test, then as part of procedure for closing down the well and moving the rig, telltale signs that something was wrong were missed. When the oil and gas reached the rig, they were diverted not overboard, as might have been wiser, but to a system called the mud-gas separator which was overwhelmed and spewed gas back on to parts of the rig that did not have safeguards on their electronics to minimise the chance of ignition, as the systems on the drilling floor did.
Then there was the blowout preventer, a huge stack of valves on the sea floor. When one of its valves was activated, after people realised something was wrong and just before the explosion, it did not stop the flow. Nor did it shut off the flow when its connections to the rig were lost, as it should have. Nor when a remotely operated vehicle activated it later. Studies of the blowout preventer’s control pods suggest that a flattish battery and a dodgy valve meant that neither was in a fit state to close off the well automatically when they should have, which BP takes as evidence of poor maintenance by Transocean. This does not explain why the great valves failed even when they were activated by other means. More answers may be forthcoming now the blowout preventer has been raised from the sea floor; currently in the custody of the Department of Justice, it may be a forensic treasure.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Transocean rejects the report as self-serving, and points to issues with the well’s design, as well as to the cement log, as deserving much more scrutiny. Other oil companies have also pointed to BP’s decision to run a single “long string” of production pipe from the top of the well to the bottom as a problem, claiming that an alternative approach which puts a physical barrier around the production pipe at an intermediate depth offers greater safety. The issue is clearly an important one, but it is not clear that in itself it made a crucial difference. If oil got into the production pipe from the bottom, then barriers that would have impeded its flow up the cavity around that pipe would have made little difference.
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Business Times Sept2010
Keppel built the 'right' rig in Gulf of Mexico
(SINGAPORE) Keppel Corporation did not build the oil rig that exploded, sank and caused a major oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico that damaged marine and wildlife habitats as well as the Gulf's fishing and tourism industries.
On the contrary, the Singapore yard provided the rig from which efforts to plug the spill were mounted.
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was told of this by a Keppel executive in Houston recently - and he used the story last night in his National Day Rally speech to make a point: companies must find promising opportunities, develop expertise, create value and grow a competitive and profitable business.
It's one key role that they can play in Singapore's push for higher productivity growth.
Singapore rigbuilders have clearly carved a niche in the global business. Mr Lee pointed out that Keppel, along with Sembcorp Marine, another Singapore company, produces 70 per cent of the world's oil rigs.
And it's clear that Keppel is good at what it does.
Mr Lee employed diagrams to show how massive the operation is to plug the well from where the oil is spilt into the Gulf of Mexico.
'Keppel built the Q4000 platform, from which engineers carried out the 'top kill' operation,' he said.
SembMarine also played a role in the rescue. Mr Lee noted that there are two other platforms, one built by SembMarine and the other by Keppel, to drill relief wells to seal the well with concrete and achieve a 'bottom kill'.
'Not bad for a country with no oil, but we're there,' he said.
And it explains why Keppel and SembMarine have been paying good bonuses to workers - nine months' last year - and 'several hundred million dollars' in taxes to the government yearly.
'That's productivity,' Mr Lee said
With events and errors ticked off day by day, hour by hour and then minute by minute as the implacable oil rises from below, the investigation report by BP released on September ( full report could be downloaded from BP website) makes eerie reading. Its tragedy unfolds in four acts, each containing a number of errors: the initial penetration of hydrocarbons into the well through cement seals and physical barriers meant to be impermeable; the subsequent failure to spot that the seals had not worked and that oil and gas were building up in the well as rig workers turned, unaware, to other tasks; the subsequent rig-wrecking explosions; and, at the sea floor, the failure of the blowout preventer to cut off the flow of oil as the rig toppled and its connection to the well below broke open, releasing oil into the Gulf for the next three months. All these findings could be shifting more of the blame to others and looks like BP could be washing it's hands away from some of the "oily" mess.
In the first act, the report claims that Halliburton supplied a cement slurry of its own devising which it should have recognised was not fit for the purpose. Subsequent testing showed that the cement produced by a similar slurry (Halliburton’s own was apparently not made available) would have been likely to break down. BP’s well team, the report goes on, failed to appreciate the challenges of the cementing, to assess the risks and to make sure it knew what was going on. Analysis by Halliburton suggested that extra “centralisers”, which keep the pipe that transports the oil in the right position, were needed. BP procured them but did not use them, its well team suspecting, wrongly, that they were the wrong sort. The report concludes that this error is unlikely to have been key to the cement failure, but it is a pretty striking mistake and others will likely differ on its significance. The team then failed to run a test, or log, to show that the cement seal was OK, a failure that has already been criticised by others.
In the second and third acts, after the hydrocarbons had got through valves at the bottom of the well, the focus shifts to Transocean, and at times to decisions made by people who died in the disaster. When the heavy drilling mud that provides the pressure needed to keep things from coming up the well was removed, first as a test, then as part of procedure for closing down the well and moving the rig, telltale signs that something was wrong were missed. When the oil and gas reached the rig, they were diverted not overboard, as might have been wiser, but to a system called the mud-gas separator which was overwhelmed and spewed gas back on to parts of the rig that did not have safeguards on their electronics to minimise the chance of ignition, as the systems on the drilling floor did.
Then there was the blowout preventer, a huge stack of valves on the sea floor. When one of its valves was activated, after people realised something was wrong and just before the explosion, it did not stop the flow. Nor did it shut off the flow when its connections to the rig were lost, as it should have. Nor when a remotely operated vehicle activated it later. Studies of the blowout preventer’s control pods suggest that a flattish battery and a dodgy valve meant that neither was in a fit state to close off the well automatically when they should have, which BP takes as evidence of poor maintenance by Transocean. This does not explain why the great valves failed even when they were activated by other means. More answers may be forthcoming now the blowout preventer has been raised from the sea floor; currently in the custody of the Department of Justice, it may be a forensic treasure.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Transocean rejects the report as self-serving, and points to issues with the well’s design, as well as to the cement log, as deserving much more scrutiny. Other oil companies have also pointed to BP’s decision to run a single “long string” of production pipe from the top of the well to the bottom as a problem, claiming that an alternative approach which puts a physical barrier around the production pipe at an intermediate depth offers greater safety. The issue is clearly an important one, but it is not clear that in itself it made a crucial difference. If oil got into the production pipe from the bottom, then barriers that would have impeded its flow up the cavity around that pipe would have made little difference.
##########################################################################
Business Times Sept2010
Keppel built the 'right' rig in Gulf of Mexico
(SINGAPORE) Keppel Corporation did not build the oil rig that exploded, sank and caused a major oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico that damaged marine and wildlife habitats as well as the Gulf's fishing and tourism industries.
On the contrary, the Singapore yard provided the rig from which efforts to plug the spill were mounted.
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was told of this by a Keppel executive in Houston recently - and he used the story last night in his National Day Rally speech to make a point: companies must find promising opportunities, develop expertise, create value and grow a competitive and profitable business.
It's one key role that they can play in Singapore's push for higher productivity growth.
Singapore rigbuilders have clearly carved a niche in the global business. Mr Lee pointed out that Keppel, along with Sembcorp Marine, another Singapore company, produces 70 per cent of the world's oil rigs.
And it's clear that Keppel is good at what it does.
Mr Lee employed diagrams to show how massive the operation is to plug the well from where the oil is spilt into the Gulf of Mexico.
'Keppel built the Q4000 platform, from which engineers carried out the 'top kill' operation,' he said.
SembMarine also played a role in the rescue. Mr Lee noted that there are two other platforms, one built by SembMarine and the other by Keppel, to drill relief wells to seal the well with concrete and achieve a 'bottom kill'.
'Not bad for a country with no oil, but we're there,' he said.
And it explains why Keppel and SembMarine have been paying good bonuses to workers - nine months' last year - and 'several hundred million dollars' in taxes to the government yearly.
'That's productivity,' Mr Lee said
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